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Design by Contract
to Improve Software Vigilance
Yves Le Traon, Benoit Baudry, Member, IEEE, and Jean-Marc Je´ze´quel, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Design by Contract is a lightweight technique for embedding elements of formal specification (such as invariants, pre and
postconditions) into an object-oriented design. When contracts are made executable, they can play the role of embedded, online
oracles. Executable contracts allow components to be responsive to erroneous states and, thus, may help in detecting and locating
faults. In this paper, we define Vigilance as the degree to which a program is able to detect an erroneous state at runtime.
Diagnosability represents the effort needed to locate a fault once it has been detected. In order to estimate the benefit of using Design
by Contract, we formalize both notions of Vigilance and Diagnosability as software quality measures. The main steps of measure
elaboration are given, from informal definitions of the factors to be measured to the mathematical model of the measures. As is the
standard in this domain, the parameters are then fixed through actual measures, based on a mutation analysis in our case. Several
measures are presented that reveal and estimate the contribution of contracts to the overall quality of a system in terms of vigilance
and diagnosability.
Index Terms—Object-oriented design methods, programming by contract, diagnostics, metrics.
Ç
1 INTRODUCTION
SEVERAL works advocate the use of assertions to improvesoftware quality [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], but very few are
actually interested in measuring this improvement. This
paper aims at bridging the gap between intuitive under-
standing of what assertions improve in software and a
quantitative, accurate estimate of these improvements. We
focus on Design by Contract as a method to place assertions
at specific locations in an object-oriented (OO) system.
Design by Contract was introduced by Meyer [6] as a
lightweight technique for embedding elements of formal
specification into an OO design through pre and postcondi-
tions of methods and class invariants. In practice, Design by
Contract is acknowledged to be a reasonable trade-off
between the full extent of formal specifications (as a
complete description of the behavior of the system) and
the effort acceptable to developers [7]. More than making
the classes’ interfaces explicit, the observed benefits of this
approach are to help in detecting and locating faults since
executable contracts can play the role of embedded and
online oracles [8].
In the usual sense, vigilance can be defined as the quality
or state of being wakeful and alert. This notion can be
extended to the software domain as the ability of a system
to dynamically detect an erroneous internal state. Based on
this informal definition, we can say that contracts contribute
to making a system more “vigilant” about the correctness of
its internal execution state. Vigilance is a useful building
block for setting a robustness mechanism, a mechanism for
recovering from an error before a failure occurs can be
attached to each contract violation. A property related to
vigilance is diagnosability, which represents the effort
needed to locate a fault in a system knowing that this fault
has caused a failure.
This paper proposes a model that captures the impact of
design by contract on vigilance1 and diagnosability. It
extends the preliminary work of [9] by providing a
complete mathematical model and a more detailed analysis
of the impact of design-by-contract and by illustrating the
whole approach with precise examples. We define vigilance
and diagnosability in the context of a contract-based design
approach since software with embedded executable con-
tracts can detect internal anomalies during execution (the
system is thus more vigilant) and help in pinpointing the
fault location (the contract that detects the erroneous state is
expected to be close to the fault).
The elaboration of the models for vigilance and diagno-
sability measures follows a precisely defined framework.
An important part of this elaboration consists of expressing
the measure and isolating each parameter on which it
depends. This process is given here only for vigilance and is
published in [10] for diagnosability. Once the parameters
are isolated, a mathematical definition of the measure can
be established. Several experiments have been conducted to
measure values for these parameters on a case study. The
case study is written in Eiffel, which is an object-oriented
language with native support for the implementation of
contracts. The most important criterion is the ability of
contracts to detect errors. This is called the efficiency of
contracts and it is estimated by adapting mutation analysis
[11]. The idea is to create faulty versions of the system by
injecting errors. When a contract is violated during the
execution of a faulty system, it means that the contract has
detected an error. With values for every parameter, it is
possible to estimate the impact of contracts on vigilance and
diagnosability. The interest of these estimates is to allow a
prediction of the effort that the programmer must devote to
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writing contracts in order to reach a certain level of
vigilance and diagnosability.
Section 2 opens on a presentation of the design by
contract approach and an intuitive analysis of some
expected benefits of the approach: vigilance and diagnosa-
bility improvement. Section 3 concentrates on vigilance
definition, definition of the expected measure properties,
and calibration of the model parameters on several case
studies. Section 4 presents experiments to tune the para-
meters for the vigilance measure. Section 5 is devoted to
diagnosability analysis, along the same lines as for
vigilance. Last, Section 6 discusses related work.
2 THE PROBLEM DOMAIN: DESIGN BY CONTRACT
AND MEASURES ELABORATION
Since fault, error, and failure are notions used throughout
the whole paper, we take the definitions given in [12]: A
fault designates the cause of an error, an error is the part of
the system which is liable to lead to a failure, and a failure is
the deviation from the delivered service compliance with
the specification. This section introduces the design by
contract methodology and the underlying theory. We also
summarize elements of the Object Constraint Language
(OCL) that is used for illustration in the paper. Finally, a
generic framework for measures elaboration is proposed.
2.1 Design by Contract
The notion of software contract has been defined to capture
mutual obligations and benefits among classes. Experience
tells us that simply unambiguously spelling out these
contracts is a worthwhile design approach [13], whichMeyer
named theDesign by Contract approach to software construc-
tion [14]. Buildingon the idea of defensiveprogramming [15],
where it is recommended to protect every software module
by as many checks as possible, the design by contract
approach provides a methodological guideline for building
vigilant, yet modular and simple systems.
The design by contract approach prompts developers to
precisely specify every consistency condition that could go
wrong and to explicitly assign the responsibility of its
enforcement to either the routine caller (the client) or the
routine implementation (the contractor). Along the line of
abstract data type theory, a common way of specifying
software contracts is to use Boolean assertions called pre
and postconditions for each service offered, as well as class
invariants for defining general consistency properties. A
contract carries mutual obligations and benefits: The client
should only call a contractor routine in a state where the
class invariant and the precondition of the routine hold. In
return, the contractor promises that, when the routine
returns, the work specified in the postcondition will be
done and the class invariant still holds.
A failure to meet the contract terms indicates the
presence of a fault, or a bug. A precondition violation
points out a contract broken by the client: The contractor
then does not have to try to comply with its part of the
contract, but may signal the fault by raising an exception. A
postcondition violation points out a bug in the routine
implementation, which does not fulfill its promises.
Since the work presented in this paper studies the impact
of adding contracts to a program, we give a precise
definition of contract and also make clear two important
notions: contract correctness and completeness.
Contract. A method contract is a set of assertions that are
evaluated before and after the execution of one method. There is
one contract for each method in the program that is composed
of a pre and a postcondition and of the invariant of the class.
Correct contract. A contract is correct if it is never violated by a
correct call of a correct implementation. A precondition in a
correct contract is never violated by a legal input for the
method. A postcondition in a correct contract is never violated
if there is no fault in the method.
Complete contract. A contract is complete for a method if the
invariant and the precondition completely define the domain of
the legal inputs for the method and if the postcondition and the
invariant always detect an erroneous state after the method’s
execution.
Concerning these definitions, several important points
have to be noticed. First, an empty contract (no pre or
postcondition and no invariant) is correct. Second, as
specified in the introduction, contracts offer a way to
embed some elements of formal specification, not necessa-
rily all; completeness is not necessarily the objective when
writing contracts for a class. When writing contracts, it is
important to embed the most important properties but also
to write assertions that are not too complex: Writing them
has to be simpler than writing the method. The work
presented in this paper investigates the benefits of putting
more or less effort into completing contracts (under the
assumption that the contracts are correct). We study the
benefits of the contracts’ improvement on two factors:
vigilance and diagnosability. A contract is said to be
efficient if it has a high probability of detecting an
erroneous state. So, the more complete a contract is, the
more efficient it is.
2.2 The UML and the OCL
In this paper, the Unified Modeling Language (UML) is
used to specify the system architecture and contracts are
expressed using the Object Constraint Language (OCL) [16].
The OCL [16] is a formal language to express constraints on
UML diagrams. It can be used to describe invariant on
classes and pre and postconditions on methods. The
different types of constraints as well as some OCL
constructs are illustrated here, with a small example
displayed in Fig. 1. Invariants can be expressed for both
the BANK and BANKACCOUNT classes. The type of the
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Fig. 1. Simple class diagram of a Bank.
instance to which an invariant applies is written with the
context keyword. A constraint labeled inv is an invariant.
For example, an invariant constraint on the class BANK-
ACCOUNT specifying that the balance must be greater than
or equal to the overdraft for any instance of BANK-
ACCOUNT is written:
context BankAccount inv :
self:balance >¼ self:overdraft:
OCL enables the navigation of associations starting from a
specific object. The role name is used to designate the set of
objects on the other side of the association. For example, an
invariant constraining any BANK instance to have at least
one account is designated in the following way:
context Bank inv :
self:accounts > size > 0:
For pre and postconditions, the constraints are labeled with
the keywords pre and post. In postconditions, OCL also
enables access of the state before the operation, using the@pre
operator. A precondition for the deposit method in BANK-
ACCOUNT is that the sum passed as a parameter is positive
and a postcondition states that the balance at the end of this
method is equal to the balance before themethod call plus the
sum. These constraints are expressed as follows:
context BankAccount : depositðsum : realÞ : void
pre sum > 0
post self:balance ¼ self:balance@preþ sum:
2.3 Contracts for Vigilance and Diagnosability
In this paper, we focus on measuring the benefit of a design
by contract approach for vigilance and diagnosability.
When contracts are executable, their main impacts on the
final product quality are twofold:
. Since contracts raise exceptions when violated, a
faulty program state can be automatically detected
during execution (due to a fault or bug). A specific
mechanism can then be implemented to avoid the
failure that would have certainly occurred. The
intuition is that contracts can help improve software
robustness by enhancing the vigilance of the system
to erroneous states. The question is: How much do
contracts help software vigilance, depending on
their efficiency and number?
. When a contract is violated, it points out the part of
the code where a faulty program state has been
detected. With no contract embedded in the soft-
ware, the failure might be detected later, maybe at
the main outputs of the system. Since the scope of
diagnosis (the number of statements in which the
fault must be located) can be reduced when
contracts are used to catch faults, contracts help in
the diagnosis task. The question is: How much do
contracts reduce the diagnosis effort depending on
their efficiency and number?
Fig. 2 illustrates the difference between software with no
contract (top of the figure) and the same designed by
contract. Considering an execution thread and an infection
point, in the first case, the error is propagated along the
execution thread and produces a failure at the output of the
program. In the second case, contracts are checked that can
detect the error and raise an exception, thus preventing the
propagation of the fault. Our intuition is that software
designed by contract might allow an early detection of fault
(during its propagation to the outputs) and help locate the
faulty part of the software by reducing the “diagnosis
scope” in which the fault must be located. When contracts
are violated and a erroneous state detected, a recovery
mechanism can be used to deal with this error and put the
software in a safe state.
2.4 Measure Elaboration
The literature insists on the difficulty of elaborating valid
measures [17], [18], [19], [20]. In this paper, since the factors
to be measured (namely, vigilance and diagnosability) first
appear as quite abstract and unclear, we choose to make a
property-based definition of the measures [20]. The usual
steps of the measure elaboration are:
1. Identifying the factor to be measured.
2. Identifying the attributes upon which the factor
depends.
3. Expressing intuitive properties.
4. Defining a formal model of the measure.
5. Checking the properties in the formal model.
The factor to be measured (1) is first informally defined
and significant and measurable attributes (2) are identified
(with intuitive and hopefully convincing arguments and
assumptions). These attributes can be measured on a
program. The number of contracts in the software and the
mean number of statements between two contracts are
examples of attributes. Then, the intuitive properties (3) of
the factor’s behavior must be expressed: These are called
axioms in [20]. These properties express how the factor
behaves when the software evolves (for example, the
addition of a contract, system concatenation).
Based on the measurable attributes, a formal model of the
measure can then be proposed (4): It is richer than the
expressed properties (in the other case, the formalmodel is of
no interest). The theoretical evaluation (5) is carried out so as
to check the consistency of the proposed measure with the
expected intuitive properties. This theoretical evaluation
precedes empirical evaluation since it is less time-consuming
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Fig. 2. Contracts for early detection of a fault.
and more appropriate to show that the model is internally
consistent: It is used to detect that no pathological structures
exist for which the model produces inappropriate behavior.
3 MEASURING VIGILANCE IMPROVEMENT
This section presents a model of the relationship between a
component’s vigilance and its contracts. A measure of the
contracts’ efficiency is proposed and the improvement in
vigilance brought by contracts is explained.
3.1 Definitions
In the context of this study, a fault is a statement or a set
of statements (or even omission of statements) that can
lead to an error. An error is the state of a particular object
(i.e., the set of the values of its attributes) in the system
that can lead to a failure. For example, let us look at a
faulty version of the BANKACCOUNT class (Fig. 3). In the
deposit method, the statement balance ¼ balance sum
should be balance ¼ balanceþ sum. This statement is a
fault: When it is executed, the balance attribute of the
BANKACCOUNT class will be assigned a wrong value.
The state of the object after execution of this method is
said to be an error. This error will actually cause a failure
since the value of balance is not consistent with the
expected value expressed in the postcondition
ðself:balance ¼ self:balance@preþ sumÞ.
The term component is also very much used in the
following definitions. In this work, it designates either a
class in an object-oriented system or a set of classes grouped
in a package with a well-defined interface (in terms of
required and provided services). Now, let us give a first
informal definition of vigilance.
Vigilance (informal definition). Vigilance expresses the
probability that the system contracts dynamically detect
erroneous states that would have otherwise provoked a failure.
Isolated Vigilance (Vigi). The isolated vigilance Vigi of a
component Ci in a system S is defined as the probability that
an internal error in Ci is detected by Ci. Conversely, the
“weakness,” Weaki, of the component is equal to the
probability that the error is not detected.
The notion of internal error is introduced in this definition.
An internal error inCi is an erroneous state of the component
Ci. The detection mechanisms we focus on are executable
contracts. So, an error is said to be detected if a contract is
violated because of this error. For example, the fault in Fig. 3
causesan internal error inBANKACCOUNT that isdetectedby
the postcondition for the depositmethod. Some components
cannot directly be executed (e.g., abstract or generic classes).
Nevertheless, they may still be equipped with their own
contracts that can detect their internal errors. For example,
there can be concretemethods in abstract classes and, when a
class that inherits from the abstract class is executed, the
contracts of the abstract class can detect errors in the concrete
parts of the class.
Global Vigilance (V). The global vigilance V of a system
composed of a set of interconnected components is defined as
the probability that an internal error is detected by any of the
components. Conversely, the “weakness,” Weak, of a system is
equal to the probability that the error is not detected
ðV ðSÞ ¼ 1WeakðSÞÞ.
It has to be noted that an error in a component plugged
into a system can be detected either by the component itself
or by one of its client or subclasses. Intuitively, the global
vigilance cannot be directly deduced by the knowledge of
local components vigilance. We argue that a relationship
exists between local and global vigilance, but that addi-
tional information on the architecture is needed to evaluate
the global vigilance. The proposed model extracts the main
attributes from a UML class diagram to compute the global
vigilance based on local ones. This consideration leads to
the definition of the local vigilance of a component plugged
into a system.
Local Vigilance (LocVig(C, S)). The local vigilance,
LocVig(C, S) of a component C in a system S is defined as
the probability that an internal error in C is detected either by
itself or by any other component of the system.
We distinguish between local and isolated vigilance
because an error in Ci might not be detected by Ci’s
contracts. This error might then propagate through the
system and might be detected by contracts in another
component. The vigilance of a component plugged into a
system is thus different from the vigilance of the same
component outside any particular context. Both isolated
and local vigilance measure the likelihood of detecting an
error in a single component, while the global vigilance
concerns the whole system.
3.2 Expected Properties
Expected properties define what should be comparable and
generic characteristics that these measures must satisfy.
Based on the definitions given in the previous paragraph,
two sets of properties are provided: global and local
properties (in that case for local and isolated vigilance).
They set up the basis for the theoretical evaluation.
Measures’ profiles:
. V igi: Component ! Real over ½0::1 : the isolated
vigilance of a component.
. Weaki: Component ! Real over ½0::1 : the isolated
weakness of a component. V igi ¼ 1Weaki.
. LocV igðC; SÞ:
Component System ! Real over½0::1: the local vig-
ilance of a component in a system S.
. LocWeakðC; SÞ: Component System ! Real over
½0::1 : the opposite of the local vigilance of C in S:
the local weakness.
. V : System Architecture ! Real over ½0::1 : the global
vigilance of a system.
Since all vigilance measures are probabilities, they are
bounded between 0 and 1, a 1 meaning perfect vigilance
(internal errors are always detected) and 0 a nonvigilant
system or component.
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Fig. 3. Example for a fault, an error, and a failure.
3.2.1 Local Vigilance Properties
LVP1—Component comparison. All components of a system
are comparable in terms of local and isolated vigilance.
LVP2—Component with no contracts (or assertions).
Components that have no contracts (or assertions or other fault
detection mechanisms) have an isolated vigilance value of 0.
The following properties concern the intuitive behavior of
themeasureswhenapplyingusual designoperations: system
concatenation, contracts addition, and contracts improve-
ment. These operations correspond to the following actions:
. Concatenation: Models any operation that allows
the connection of two systems to produce a new
one (for example, using inheritance, client/provi-
der dependencies).
. Contract addition: Operation consisting of adding a
contract to a system component (pre/postcondi-
tions, invariants).
. Contract improvement: Operation consisting of
adding a new clause to an existing contract to check
the consistency of a property that is not yet verified.
A contract is thus improved iff it checks more
properties of the component. Let us take the
withdraw method in the BANKACCOUNT class
(Fig. 1). A precondition for this method can be:
context BankAccount :: withdrawðsum : floatÞ :
void
pre sum > 0
Improving this precondition consists of adding a
new clause, for example:
context BankAccount :: withdrawðsum : floatÞ :
void
pre sum > 0 and sum  balance overdraft
LVP3 System concatenation. The isolated vigilance of a
component included in a system S1 is unmodified by
concatenation to a system S2 and its local vigilance cannot
decrease.
LVP4 Contract (assertion) addition. In a system, the local and
isolated vigilance of a component cannot decrease by addition
of a contract in the system.
LVP5 Contract improvement. The improvement of a contract
of a component Ci in a system must increase its isolated and
local vigilance. The other components local (and obviously
isolated) vigilance cannot decrease.
3.2.2 Global Vigilance Properties
GVP1—System comparison. Two systems are always compar-
able in terms of vigilance.
GVP2—System concatenation. The global vigilance of a
system obtained by concatenation of two systems S1 and S2
cannot be lower than the lowest vigilance of S1 and S2.
GVP3—Contract addition. For any system, its global vigilance
cannot decrease by addition of a contract.
3.3 Assumptions and Mathematical Model
A component isolated from the system will have an isolated
vigilance corresponding to the efficiency of its embedded
contracts. A component Ci plugged into a system has a
vigilance enhanced by the fact that its clients (other
components that use Ci) bring their contracts to help the
fault detection. The notion of dependency is thus introduced
to determine the relationship between a component and its
clients in a system.
Dependency. A component Ci is dependent on Cj if it uses
services from Cj. This dependency relationship is noted:
Ci RD Cj. For example, in Fig. 4, component C is dependent
on D ðCRD DÞ, and components A and B are dependent on C
(ARD C and BRD C).
DetðCi;CjÞ. If Ci RD Cj, then the probability that Ci’s
contracts detect an error in Cj is noted DetðCi; CjÞ.
We notice that, according to this definition, Det(C, C) is
the isolated vigilance of C. In the next section, we give a
way to estimate the vigilance of a component and
probability DetðCi;CjÞ.
The dependency relationship is not necessarily transi-
tive. In Fig. 4, A depends on C and C depends on D, but it is
not possible to decide whether A depends on D without
looking at the code. If A uses services of C which do not call
any service of D, then A does not depend on D. Since we
focus on the model to evaluate the local vigilance, we can
consider only errors that are detected by a component
directly dependent on the faulty one. The results obtained
from a model are thus an estimate of the actual local
vigilance that would be obtained by taking into account all
dependencies. The local vigilance LocVigðCi; SÞ ð¼ 1
LocWeakðCi; SÞÞ of the component Ci in system S is the
probability that an error in the component Ci is detected
either by contracts of Ci or by the contracts of the
components that use Ci. To get this probability, we evaluate
LocWeakðCi; SÞ. LocWeakðCi; SÞ is the probability that an
error in Ci is not detected locally by Ci multiplied by the
probability that the error is not detected by the clients of Ci.
This last probability is the product of 1DetðCk;CiÞ for all
k such that Ck RD Ci.
LocWeakðCi; SÞ ¼ Weaki 
Y
k
ð1DetðCk;CiÞÞ; k=CkRDCi:
Finally, the global vigilance V of the system is thus equal to:
VðSÞ ¼ 1WeakðSÞ
¼ 1
Xn
i¼1
Prob errðCi; SÞ  LocWeakðCi; SÞ;
where Prob errorðCi; SÞ is the probability the failure in S
comes from the component Ci. This probability can be
approximated by the component’s complexity.
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Fig. 4. Example for dependency.
3.4 Properties Theoretical Evaluation
The theoretical evaluation is used to detect that no patholo-
gical structures exist for which the model produces inap-
propriate behavior. It aims at ensuring that themathematical
model fulfills the measure specification captured in the form
of properties. In this section, we illustrate this step on
property GVP3. The demonstration aims at showing that
the formal model ensures that the addition of a contract in a
system S does not decrease its global vigilance. Let us call S0
the systemafter addinga contract, theproof givenbelowaims
at proving that V ðS0Þ  V ðSÞ.
The addition of a contract in a component, for
example, C1 in Fig. 5, changes its isolated vigilance and
the local vigilance of its q server components, i.e.,
LocVigðCkÞ j C1 RD Ck. In Fig. 5, the addition of a contract
in C1 changes the isolated vigilance of C1 as well as
LocVigðC2Þ, LocVigðC3Þ, and LocVigðCqÞ.
Let us first consider the addition of a contract in C1 and
C01, the component after the contract addition. The isolated
vigilance of C01 is greater than or equal to the isolated
vigilance of C1:
DetðC01;C01Þ  DetðC1;C1Þ: ð1Þ
The probability that C01 detects an error in one of its servers
is greater than or equal to the probability that C1 detects the
error: 8 k j C1 RD Ck, DetðC01;CkÞ  DetðC1;CkÞ, so:Y
k
ð1DetðC01;CkÞÞ 
Y
k
ð1DetðC1;CkÞÞ;
i.e.,
8 k j C1 RD Ck;LocWeakðCk; S0Þ  LocWeakðCk; SÞ: ð2Þ
The servers of C1 are ½C2;C3 . . . Cq and V ðS0Þ is the
following:
VðS0Þ ¼ 1
XS0j j
i¼ðqþ1Þ
ðProb ErrðC0i; S0Þ  LocWeakðC0i; S0ÞÞ
þ
Xq
i¼1
ðProb ErrðC0i; S0Þ  LocWeakðC0i; S0ÞÞ:
For i > q, LocWeakðC0i; S0Þ ¼ LocWeakðCi; SÞ because the
addition of a contract has no influence on the vigilance of
components with an id > q since C1 does not depend on
them. Moreover, since the number of components in S0 does
not change, jS0j ¼ jSj and Prob ErrðC0i; S0Þ ¼ Prob ErrðCi; SÞ.
The vigilance V ðS0Þ can be rewritten:
VðS0Þ ¼ 1
XjSj
i¼ðqþ1Þ
ðProb ErrðCi; SÞ  LocWeakðCi; SÞÞ
þ
Xq
i¼1
ðProb ErrðC0i; S0Þ  LocWeakðC0i; S0ÞÞ:
Since we have made the assumption that C1RDC2,
C1RDC3, and C1RDCq, then, from (2) we can deduce
that 8 k 2 ½2 :: qLocWeakðCk; S0Þ  LocWeakðCk; SÞ. More-
over (1) states that DetðC01;C01Þ  DetðC1;C1Þ, i.e.,
LocWeakðC1; S0Þ  LocWeakðC1; SÞ. Then,
Xq
i¼1
ðProb ErrðC0i; S0Þ  LocWeakðC0i; S0ÞÞ

Xq
i¼1
ðProb ErrðCi; SÞ  LocWeakðCi; SÞÞ
and:
XjSj
i¼qþ1
ðProb ErrðCi; SÞ  LocWeakðCi; SÞÞ
þ
Xq
i¼1
ðProb ErrðC0i; S0Þ  LocWeakðC0i; S0ÞÞ

XjSj
i¼qþ1
ðProb ErrðCi; SÞ  LocWeakðCi; SÞÞ
þ
Xq
i¼1
Prob ðErrðCi; SÞ  LocWeakðCi; SÞÞ:
Finally:
VðS0Þ  1
XjSj
i¼qþ1
ðProb ErrðCi; SÞ  LocWeakðCi; SÞÞ
þ
Xq
i¼1
ðProb ErrðCi; SÞ  LocWeakðCi; SÞÞ;
i.e., V ðS0Þ  V ðSÞ.
4 MODEL PARAMETERIZATION AND CASE STUDY
In Section 3.3, three parameters have been isolated for the
computation of the vigilance: LocVigðCi; SÞ, DetðCi;CjÞ, and
Prob ErrðCi; SÞ. This section reports experiments that were
conducted to estimate the value of these parameters in a
system. The idea is to inject errors in the system and check
how many of them the contracts are able to detect. The
proportion of errors detected by the contracts is an estimation
of the local vigilance of a component. Mutation analysis is
used as a systematic process for fault injection and the
estimation of actual values forWeaki and DetðCi;CjÞ.
4.1 Mutation Analysis
Mutation analysis was initially proposed by DeMillo et al.
in [11] to create effective test data, with an important fault
revealing power [21], [22]. This analysis consists of creating
a set of faulty versions of a program, called mutants, with
the ultimate goal of designing a set of test cases that
distinguishes the program from all its mutants. In practice,
faults are modeled by a set of mutation operators, where each
operator represents a class of software faults. A mutant is a
copy of the program under test into which one fault has
been injected.
A set of test cases is adequate if it distinguishes the
original program from all its nonequivalent mutants.
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Fig. 5. Adding a contract in C1.
Otherwise, a mutation score (MS) is associated with the test
cases set to measure its effectiveness in terms of the
percentage of the revealed nonequivalent mutants. A
mutant is considered equivalent to the original program if
there exists no input data on which the mutant and the
original program produce a different output. A benefit of
the mutation score is that, even if no error is found, it still
measures how well the software has been tested, giving the
user information about the quality of the test cases. It can be
viewed as a kind of reliability assessment for the test cases.
During the test selection process, a mutant program is
said to be killed if at least one test case detects the fault
injected into the mutant. Conversely, a mutant is said to be
alive if no test case detects the injected fault (living mutant).
To kill mutants, an oracle is needed for the test set. For all
the experiments described in this paper, we used two
oracles for the mutation analysis. They are defined below.
Behavioral difference oracle. This oracle is very specific to the
mutation analysis and is based on the assumption that the
original program is correct. When running a mutation
analysis for a class, let Outo be the set of outputs when
running the tests with the original class, let Outm be the set of
outputs for tests with a mutant class. If Outm 6¼ Outo, then
the mutant is killed by the tests set. This is called the
behavioral difference oracle for mutation analysis.
For the case studies, we used a perfect behavioral
difference oracle to have a reference for estimating the
contract efficiency. This perfect oracle compares the objects
of the mutant program and the objects of the initial program
in depth (deep_equal in Eiffel). Since the comparison is
made on the full internal state of the objects, it is, by
definition, the most efficient oracle function, hence a perfect
oracle. When nonequivalent mutants survive the perfect
oracle, it simply means that our test set is incomplete.
Contracts as oracles. When running tests for a system with
executable contracts, if a contract is violated, an exception is
raised and the system can stop. In the context of a mutation
analysis, if the system stops because of a contract violation when
running the tests on amutant program, themutant is killed. This
is how contracts are used as oracles in mutation analysis.
In our experiments, the choice of mutation operators (see
[23] for other possible operators for OO) includes selective
relational and arithmetic operator replacement, variable
perturbation, but also referencing faults (aliasing errors) for
declared objects:
. EHF (Exception Handling Fault): Causes an excep-
tion when executed.
. AOR (Arithmetic Operator Replacement): Replaces
occurrences of “þ” by “” and vice versa.
. LOR (Logical Operator Replacement): Each occur-
rence of one of the logical operators (and, or, nand, nor,
xor) is replaced by each of the other operators; in
addition, the expression is replaced by TRUE and
FALSE.
. ROR (Relational Operator Replacement): Each oc-
currence of one of the relational operators ð<;>;<
¼; >¼;¼; = ¼Þ is replaced by each one of the other
operators.
. NOR (No Operation Replacement): Replaces each
statement by the Null statement.
. VCP (Variable and Constant Perturbation): Con-
stants and variables values are slightly modified to
emulate domain perturbation testing. Each constant
or variable of arithmetic type is both incremented by
one and decremented by one. Each Boolean is
replaced by its complement.
. RFI (Referencing Fault Insertion): Nullify the refer-
ence of an object after its creation. Suppress a clone
or copy instruction. Insert a clone instruction for
each reference affectation. Operator RFI introduces
object aliasing and object reference faults, most
common in object-oriented programming.
The process of creating mutants with all the operators
listed above, executing every test case with the original
program and all the mutants, collecting the verdicts for all
test cases, and computing the mutation score has been
automated in a prototype tool. More details about mutation
analysis and our implementation of this process can be
found in [24]. The study is in Eiffel since design by contract
is natively supported by Eiffel and there exist libraries with
contracts. We could not apply OO operators since they were
not available at the time we started our studies. Moreover,
currently, the only available mutation tool implementing
OO operators is dedicated to Java (MuJava).
4.2 Mutation Analysis for Estimating the Efficiency
of Contracts
The goal of the study is to check the contracts efficiency only
on mutants that are killed by one test case at least, using the
behavioral difference oracle (deep-equals on object pro-
grams). We thus defined a two-steps experimental process
that applies mutation analysis for two different purposes:
1. Generation of a set of test cases that has a high
mutation score.
2. Evaluation of the efficiency of the contracts for a
given class.
In the first step, we used mutation analysis to guide the
generation of test cases for each class. The generation of unit
test cases for a class consisted of generating a set of mutants
and of incrementally building a set of test cases that could
kill every mutant. The process started with an initial set of
test cases written by hand and that covered all nominal
cases for the class. Then, the mutation score for these test
cases was computed using the behavioral difference as an
oracle. If the mutation score was not satisfactory, we looked
at the living mutants. We isolated the equivalents and
added new test cases (by hand) to kill as many of the living
mutants as possible. At the end of this process, a set of test
cases is obtained with a mutation score between 90 percent
and 100 percent for each class.
The second mutation analysis aimed at evaluating the
efficiency of the contracts for a class. The intuition is that, if
contracts for a class are complete, they should kill all the
mutants killed at Step 1. If the contracts are not complete, the
mutation score is an estimate of their ability to detect an error.
This mutation analysis used the contracts as an oracle. We
suppressed the equivalent mutants and the nonequivalent
living mutants since there is no chance for a living mutant
(with a behavioral difference oracle) being killed by a
contract. We executed the test cases generated during the
previous analysis on all themutants that were killed by these
test cases. For instance, if we consider that there are 10
equivalentmutantsplus10mutantsaliveamong100mutants,
we reexecute the test cases against the 80 killedmutants using
contracts as an oracle. If only 20 mutants are killed, the
efficiency of the contracts is 25 percent (20/80). If, after the
improvement of contracts, 60 mutants are killed, the
efficiency of the contracts is 75 percent.
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4.3 Process for the Estimation of Parameters
Two parameters have to be estimated to compute the global
vigilance for an OO system designed by contract: the local
vigilance of classes andDetðCi;CjÞ. The isolated vigilance of a
class corresponds to theproportion of errors (in the class) that
the contracts of this class can detect. This vigilance corre-
sponds to the efficiency of the contracts for a class. It is
estimated using mutation analysis as described in previous
section. For example, Fig. 6 displays the transfermethod of
class BANKACCOUNT,with its associated pre andpostcondi-
tion. This method moves the sum from the current BANK-
ACCOUNT instance to account. The postcondition is correct
but incomplete in the sense that it does not check the new
balance of account. Fivemutants for thismethod are given in
the bottom part of the figure. The postcondition for transfer
can killmutant1,mutant3, andmutant5. Let us notice that the
invariant ðbalance  overdraftÞ can also kill mutant5 with
the method call, transfer ðbalance overdraft; bAcc1Þ.
The mutation score is 60 percent in this particular case. To
obtain the isolated vigilance for the BANKACCOUNT class,
it is necessary to generate mutants for every method in the
class and compute a global score.
To measure DetðCi;CjÞ for a component Ci, the process
consists of injecting faults in a component Cj used by Ci (Cj
is a provider for Ci). Then, we execute Ci’s tests using Ci and
each of its faulty providers. The percentage of killed
mutants in Cj by Ci is the DetðCi;CjÞ. For example, the
test cases for BANK have to be executed with mutants of
BANKACCOUNT. Let us consider the mutants for BANK-
ACCOUNT given in Fig. 6 and the automaticTransferðÞ
method in BANK (Fig. 7). This method allows an automatic
transfer from accountFrom to accountTo when the balance
of accountFrom is greater than a given threshold. The
postcondition checks that the sum of the balances of both
accounts is the same before and after a call to
automaticTransferðÞ. Let us consider a test case that calls
automaticTransferðÞ, t h e transfer m e t h o d o f
BANKACCOUNT will also be called and the postcondition
of automaticTransferðÞ will kill mutants 2 and 4 of
transfer that were not killed previously. Det(BANK,
BANKACCOUNT) is thus equal to 40 percent.
A third parameter is necessary to compute the global
vigilance, Prob errorðCi; SÞ. We make the assumption that
the probability that an error occurs in a class is the same for
every class in the system. Thus, Prob errorðCi; SÞ ¼ 1=n,
n being the number of classes in the system.
4.4 A Case Study
We use the Pylon library (http://www.nenie.org/eiffel/
pylon/) as a case study for estimating the range of values
for isolated vigilance and DetðCi;CjÞ. It is a small, portable,
freely available Eiffel library for data structures and other
basic features. The class diagram is composed of 50 classes
and 134 relations. This library is complex enough to
illustrate the approach and obtain interesting results. The
used mutation analysis tool, called mutants slayer or Slayer,
is designed for the Eiffel language. This tool injects faults in
a class under test (or a set of classes), executes tests on each
mutant program, and delivers an analysis to determine
which mutants are killed by the test cases.
Starting from a system in which each class has an
associated set of test cases and initial executable contracts
(the ones provided by the programmer of the Pylon library),
the case study first aims at studying the bounds of values
that isolated vigilance can take (min, max, average). It thus
consists ofmeasuring the initial efficiencyof the contracts and
then the efficiency of the improved contracts. These improve-
ments are incremental: We compute the efficiency of the
initial contracts and thenwe add assertions into the contracts
that have a low mutation score or add contracts to method
without one. We go on like this until we cannot improve the
contracts anymore. The results for the improvement of the
contracts aregiven inTable 1.The table summarizes the initial
efficiency of the contracts and the final level they reach after
improvement. The isolatedvigilance of classes is significantly
improved (the best improvement is from 25 percent to
100 percent). The fact that not all errors are detected by the
improved contracts reveals the limit of contracts as oracle
functions. There are several reasons for this. The first one is
that contracts are unable to detect errors disturbing the global
state of a component. It is thus not possible to improve a
contract so it can detect such an error. For example, a prune
method of a stack cannot have trivial local contracts checking
whether the element removed had been previously inserted
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Fig. 6. Example for isolated vigilance computation.
Fig. 7. Example for DetðCi;CjÞ computation.
by a put. In that case, even a class invariant would not be able
to capture this property since it would have to check that, for
all the elements in the stack, a call putting the element to the
stack must have occurred before the evaluation of the
invariant.
Another reason why contracts cannot be improved to kill
all mutants is that some contracts become very complex in
the improvement process (large number and complex
assertions) and, even if they could become complete oracles,
there is also great chance to introduce errors in them. As we
said in Section 2.1, contracts do not aim at completely
describing the behavior of the object, but aim at embedding
important elements of the specification. In the process of
contracts improvement, we thus have taken this into
account and have stopped improving contracts that were
becoming too complex. The way the contracts have been
improved is similar to the levels of detail proposed in [25].
At the end of the improvement process, the contract-
enabled component has a considerably greater capacity to
detect errors (between 72 percent and 100 percent in the
case of mutation faults for this study). As a result, this
approach points out methods for which the associated
contracts are not efficient enough.
To measure DetðCi;CjÞ values, we generate the mutants
for all provider classes Cj and we compute the mutation
score for the Ci’s test cases set on the mutants concerning
the methods Ci uses. For example, in Fig. 8, LINKED_LIST
uses LINKED_NODE and the LINKED_LIST class calls all the
methods of LINKED_NODE. The process to compute
Det(LINKED_LIST, LINKED_NODE) consists of generating
all the mutants for LINKED_NODE and running the test
cases for LINKED_LIST. The obtained mutation score
corresponds to the proportion of LINKED_NODE mutants
the contracts from LINKED_LIST are able to kill. This score is
an estimate for Det(LINKED_LIST, LINKED_NODE).
For these measures, all the classes in the system have
their contracts improved (average isolated vigilance 87 per-
cent) and the results are shown in Table 2.
4.5 Results and Limitations of the Model
To illustrate the interest of a design-by-contract approach
for vigilance improvement, we applied it a posteriori to
three real-world case studies in the domains of telecommu-
nications and compiler software.
1. A Telecommunication Switching System: Switched
multimegabits data service (SMDS) is a connection-
less, packet-switched data transport service running
on top of connected networks such as the Broadband
IntegratedServiceDigitalNetwork (B-ISDN),which is
based on the asynchronous transfer mode (ATM). A
detailed description of an SMDS server design and
implementation can be found in [26]. The class-
diagram is composed of 37 classes, with a high
connectivity degree (72 relationships between
classes).
2. The Pylon library, which has already been presented
above.
3. The InterViews (IV) library, composed of 146 classes
and 420 relationships.
For these three systems, we show the evolution of the
global vigilance with the improvement of isolated compo-
nents’ vigilance. To illustrate this evolution, we make the
assumption that the DetðCi;CjÞ probability depends on the
component’s vigilance as follows: DetðCi;CjÞ ¼ K Vigi,
where K < 1 is a coefficient that expresses the loss of
vigilance efficiency for the client component Ci when
detecting an erroneous state propagated by a provider
component Cj. This assumption is based on the observa-
tions done when checking the efficiency of contracts to
detect faults propagated by providers.
Using the measures in Table 2, we estimate the
coefficient K as K ¼ 0:8. The global vigilance evolutions
for the three systems are shown Fig. 9.
With these results, we see that using no contracts (i.e.,
isolated vigilance equals 0) implies that the system is not
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TABLE 1
Main Results for Contracts Improvement
Fig. 8. Excerpt from the Pylon library.
TABLE 2
DetðCi;CjÞ Measures
Fig. 9. Evolution of global vigilance for three systems.
vigilant, but that adding simple contracts (that are not very
efficient) improves the global vigilance rapidly. For exam-
ple, in the InterViews system, if the components isolated
vigilance is 0.4, the global vigilance is almost 0.7. Moreover,
the three curves show that improving the isolated vigilance
from 0.8 to 1, which corresponds to the most costly
improvements, is not interesting in terms of global vigilance
improvement: For InterViews, the global vigilance is
already 0.94 when the isolated components’ vigilance is 0.8.
The slight differences between the systems correspond to
different couplingvalues (dependencydensities). Indeed, the
local vigilance of a component can be increased by its clients’
contracts and improving local vigilance improves global
vigilance. So, the more coupling there is between compo-
nents, themore local vigilance is increased and the higher the
global vigilance. It is well-known that coupling is not a
desirable feature for a system since it is a factor of complexity
and is error-prone. A good design aims at reducing the
coupling and, thus, limits the global vigilance. However,
coupling cannot be completely avoided and, thus, contracts
allow us to make maximum use of this otherwise negative
property to improve the global vigilance.
In [27], Briand et al. analyze the sensitivity of the
mathematical model we propose in [9] (vigilance having
been improperly called robustness). The model is studied
and generalized under the assumption that each component
has the same isolated vigilance Vig. The following
simplified formula is obtained:
LocVigðCi; SÞ ¼ 1 ð1VigÞðK ðVigÞcl;
where cl is the number of clients of component Ci.
Briand et al. then assign a constant value to the average
number of clients for the components in a system. The local
vigilance is then also a constant LocVig. Under the assump-
tion that each component has the same probability 1/n of
being erroneous, the global vigilance V of a system is:
V ¼
Xn
i¼1
ð1=n  LocVigðC; SÞÞ ¼ LocVig:
With this simplified model, Briand et al. study the
sensitivity of the model to the number cl of clients of a class
and the coefficient K. They take values for cl between 1 and
6 and values for K between 0.2 and 0.8. Their results show
that, for these values, the model is actually sensitive to both
parameters: There is an important variation for the global
vigilance depending on the value of these parameters.
However, our experimental measures show that, in prac-
tice, K varies only between 0.5 and 0.8. Since we have
observed only small variations of K in our studies, the
results obtained with our model are still relevant consider-
ing the variations of K. Since the number cl is not a
parameter of our model, the sensitivity analysis of cl has no
relevance to the model we propose (it is suited to the
simplified model of Briand et al.). Precisely because the
coupling is important for vigilance, the dependencies for
each class are counted to obtain local vigilance values for
each class. For the three case studies shown in Fig. 9, the
number of clients has been calculated for each class of the
class diagram.
5 MEASURING DIAGNOSABILITY
A failure may be observed during the software develop-
ment as well as the maintenance stage. Diagnosis is defined
as the task that consists of locating faulty parts of a system
when a failure is detected. In the presence of contracts,
diagnosis is simplified in the following way: First, there is
no need to look at statements after the violated contract in
the execution thread. Second, in practice, locating the faulty
statement consists of proceeding backward from a violated
contract. The efficiency of diagnosis is thus linked to
vigilance since the greater the local vigilance, the more
errors will be detected by contracts and the closer the fault
might be to the violated contract.
Confronted with the problem of diagnosis, which
remains a nonautomated task, it would be useful to
appraise the probable difficulty of locating faults in the
software beforehand. Such predictor estimation is called
diagnosability (see [28] for a study of diagnosability in data
flow designs) and provides a way of improving the design
quality. Diagnosability refers to the ability to locate a fault
that has been detected during testing, i.e., the fault
localization effort. We study this factor in the context of
designed by contracts systems.
5.1 Diagnosis Practices in the Software Domain
The diagnosability of a program depends on its internal
structure and on the set of test cases (used to detect faults).
To analyze it, one needs to understand the main methods
used for locating faults in the software after they have been
detected by tests.
A first way of locating faults consists of performing some
cross-checking between information resulting from test
executions. Such systematic cross-checking of test results
and executed paths may lead to semi-automated diagnosis
strategies [29], [30], [31]. Along this line, most diagnosis
reported works are based on the program slicing techniques.
These techniques focus on the software code at the unit
and integration levels. Various slicing methods exist [32],
[33], [34], [35], [36] which basically consist of extracting
from the program a set of statements which can be executed
independently (this corresponds to a slice of the program).
The fault localization consists of executing the program slice
by slice and in analyzing each slice result. The main
limitation of this technique is its cost in terms of human
effort. Indeed, each slice implies the determination of an
oracle and, because the slices have no simple functional
meaning, it often needs human intervention.
Another possible technique for locating faulty statements
consists of inserting assertions in the program for detecting
some internal erroneous state during execution. The
systematic use of assertions before and after procedure
calls may be very efficient for detecting and locating faults.
Design by contract is a generalization of this principle.
However, the effort for defining and inserting assertions
may be important because it implies a good understanding
of the internal meaning of the procedure and expected
values of the data. Some works have focused on the way of
inserting assertions when needed in the program, with
testability criteria [1]. We focus on the diagnosability of the
software which has been designed using such a technique.
We analyze the impact of executable contracts/assertions
on system diagnosability.
5.2 Diagnosability Measure
Diagnosability, defined as the fault localization effort, is
related to the size of the sets of suspect statements. The
larger are the suspected sets, the more difficult the fault
localization. It is intuitively more difficult to distinguish the
faulty statement among 10 statements than among two
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statements. A set of statements which are equally suspect is
said to be indistinguishable. Thus, the underlying attribute
expressing the localization of faulty statements among a set
of suspect statements is called indistinguishability.
The input for the diagnosability measure is the set of
statements executed (the execution thread) when a failure
occurs or when a contract detects an error. This section starts
with the mathematical definition of the diagnosability
measure. Then, the tuning of the parameters (vigilance of
the system, number of indistinguishable statements, execu-
tion thread) is explained and the evolution of the diagnosa-
bility of a system is computed for different values of the
parameters.
The model for the measure is based on the following
assumptions:
. The software is assumed to be faulty: There exists an
execution of the system that provokes a failure if the
error is not detected by a contract.
. Contracts are assumed to be correct.
. If an execution thread is faulty on multiple points,
the diagnosis will point out the first divergence
point (faults that compensate for each other are
considered as negligible for a global estimate).
The core attribute we need to express diagnosability is
the notion of indistinguishability set, defined as follows:
Indistinguishability set (IS). An indistinguishability set
corresponds to a set of statements bounded by consecutive
contracts in an execution thread.
5.2.1 Local Diagnosability Measure
To compute the diagnosability of a system,we first define the
probability that a faulty statement is detected by a contract in
any execution thread T composed of #contracts contracts.
Since we do not distinguish statements in an indistinguish-
ability set, this probability is the same for every statement in
such a set. This probability depends on the number of
contracts along an execution thread, #contracts.
Detji . Det
j
iði 2 ½1 . . .#contracts and j 2 ½i . . . #contractsÞ is
the probability that a faulty statement in an indistinguish-
ability set ISi is detected by the contract j knowing that no
intermediary contract has detected this erroneous state. ISi is
the ith indistinguishability set along an execution thread
(bounded by two consecutive contracts as illustrated in
Fig. 10).
We have the following constraint on Detji probabilities:
X#contracts
j¼i
Detji þ Pfailure ¼ 1;
where Pfailure is the probability that no contract has
detected the faulty statement and a failure occurs. Let pk
be the probability that the contract k detects the erroneous
state due to a faulty statement in ISi. Since, for a contract k,
the nondetection of the erroneous state by any previously
executed contracts is independent events, we have:
Detji ¼ pj 
Yj1
k¼i
ð1 pkÞ:
The second parameter is the diagnosis scope. The diagnosis
scope for a detected fault is the number of statements
executed between the indistinguishability set that contains
the fault and the error detection point. Since all statements
of the indistinguishability set which contains the fault are
suspected, they are included in the diagnosis scope. When
contracts are embedded in the program, the diagnosis scope
for every statement in one particular indistinguishability set
is the same. Based on this notion of diagnosis scope, we
define the diagnosis effort. For a fault in an indistinguish-
ability set ISi, this effort is the probable number of
statements which are suspect, knowing the probability each
contract has to detect the erroneous state along the
execution thread.
Diagnosis effort of ISi ðiÞ. The local diagnosability i of any
statement in an indistinguishability set ISi along an execution
thread T is the effort needed for determining that ISi is faulty
in T. It is equal to:
i ¼
X#contracts
j¼i
DiagnosisScopeði; jÞ Detji þ Pfailure
DiagnosisScopeði;#contractsÞ;
where:
Pfailure ¼ 1
X#contracts
j¼i
Detji
and
DiagnosisScopeði; jÞ ¼
Xj
k¼i
ISkj j:
Indeed, if the fault in ISi is detected by contract j, then the
diagnosis scope associated to the indistinguishability set ISi
is equal to the number of statements between the faulty one
to the contract’s detection. The last term of i equation is
added to measure the diagnosability scope when no
contract detected the faulty statement (a failure thus occurs
at the outputs of the execution thread).
Global diagnosis effort for an execution thread ðÞ. The
global diagnosis effort for an execution thread T is the probable
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Fig. 10. Indistinguishability sets and contracts along an execution thread.
effort needed for pointing out the faulty statement, knowing
that a fault is detected in T:
 ¼
X#contracts
i¼1
ðPfaultyi  iÞ:
The diagnosis effort for an execution thread is the
probable diagnosis scope knowing the probabilities
Pfaultyi each ISi has of containing the faulty statement.
In practice, it is too hard to directly calculate Pfaultyi
and , so we make an approximation based on the following
additional assumptions:
1. The contract distribution in an execution thread
is uniform. Each IS has the same size jISj
(¼ #stats div #contracts, where #stats is the number
of statements in the program).
2. The closer a contract is to the faulty statement in ISi,
the higher the probability that it has to detect the fault
(i.e., pk decreases when k grows, k 2 ½i::#contracts).
3. The contracts have an equal probability p of
detecting a fault coming from the statements directly
preceding them (the contracts being written to check
these statements).
4. Each statement has the same probability of being
faulty, equal to 1/#stats.
The first assumption seems less realistic since it implies that
all the distances between method calls and returns in a
thread are equal. Nevertheless, experiments have been
conducted on a set of OO programs to look at the actual
distribution of method calls along an execution thread as an
estimation of the contracts distribution. Under the assump-
tion that there is a precondition at the beginning of each
method and a postcondition at the end, the distribution of
method calls along an execution thread can indeed approx-
imate the contracts distribution. We measured this distribu-
tion for five systems. The execution threads had sizes from
1,400 statements to almost two millions. The exact character-
istics for each system are given in Table 3 and the curves of
distribution are given in Appendix A. From those experi-
ments, it appears that contracts are actually homogeneously
distributed in these systems and that assumption 1 is valid
and can be taken into account to estimate the impact of
contracts on the diagnosability of systems.
The second assumption fits the intuition and has not
been experimentally verified. The first and third assump-
tions lead to a simplified measure that will reflect the global
impact of contract improvement on the diagnosis effort.
Assumption 3 is used to get the impact on diagnosability by
varying the average efficiency of contracts. Assumption 4 is
reasonable in a predictive approach since we must equally
suspect any part of the software to be faulty.
To be realistic, to model assumption 2 and be consistent
with assumption 3, we consider that if the first executed
contract has a probability p of detecting the erroneous state,
the second has only :p probability of detecting it, the third
one 2:p, and so on. The probability p corresponds to the
efficiency of the contract that directly follows the faulty
statement and  is a constant absorption coefficient
ð 2 ½0::1Þ. If  is equal to 1, it means that assumption 2
is not verified, all contracts being equivalent. If  is equal to
0, it means that only the first executed contract can detect
the fault. So, the probability a contract j detects an error due
to a fault in ISi is equal to the probability 
ji:p, which is the
probability that contract j detects the fault while all the
preceding contracts have failed. This probability is:
Yj1
k¼i
1 kip 
 !
:
We thus have:
Detji ¼ pj 
Yj1
k¼i
ð1 pkÞ ¼ jip 
Yj1
k¼i
ð1 pkÞ
¼ jip 
Yj1
k¼i
ð1 kipÞ:
Fig. 10 presents an execution thread with contracts. If there
is a fault in IS2 that is detected by contract 4, the
DiagnosisScope(2, 4) is equal to 3  jISj. More generally,
we have DiagnosisScopeði; jÞ ¼ ðj iþ 1Þ  jISj. The local
diagnosis effort can be deduced as follows:
i ¼
X#contracts
j¼i
DiagnosisScopeði; jÞ:Detji
"
þ 1
X#contracts
j¼i
Detji
 !
 ð#contracts iþ 1Þ
#
¼ ISj j
X#contracts
j¼i
ðj iþ 1Þ:Detji
"
þ 1
X#contracts
j¼i
Detji
 !
 ð#contracts iþ 1Þ
#
:
5.2.2 Model Tuning
These last equations are easily computable and depend on
three parameters: p, , and #contracts. The question now is
how to count the number of contracts and how to evaluate
their efficiency and the absorption coefficient, which are the
main parameters of the model. In any system, an appro-
priate instrumentation of the code would lead to an exact
counting for #stats and #contracts for a given execution
thread.
Section 4.3 shows that contracts’ efficiency varies between
0.17 for less efficient ones to1 for thebest one.Anaverage for a
reasonable effort is around 0.87. This efficiency corresponds
to the probability p that a contract directly following a faulty
IS in an execution thread detects the error.
Concerning the absorption coefficient, Fig. 11 gives the
various curves that reveal the sensitivity of the model to this
coefficient. We study the case in which there are 10 contracts
between the faulty statement in an ISi and the end of the
execution thread ð#contracts i ¼ 10Þ. Given an absorption
coefficient, each curve displays the probable number of
582 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, VOL. 32, NO. 8, AUGUST 2006
TABLE 3
Contracts Distribution
contracts which are executed before the error is detected as
a function of the contracts’ efficiency (p). For contracts with
efficiency of 0.4, the probable number of traversed contracts
before detection is between 3.1 and 6.1 (delta is of three
contracts). A significant loss of precision for the global
diagnosability measure can be due to a bad estimation of
the absorption coefficient (particularly if contracts’ effi-
ciency is between 0.2 and 0.7). We calibrate the absorption
coefficient to 0.8, which corresponds to the mean value
observed during experiment with the Pylon Eiffel library.
5.2.3 Global Diagnosability Measure
For local measure (attached, respectively, to a statement and
to an execution thread), the diagnosability was only
expressed in terms of diagnosis effort (in that case, a
diagnosability improvement corresponded to a reduced
diagnosis effort). At global level, it is also useful to have a
ratio to simplify comparison from one program to the other.
The global diagnosability measure (attached to a system)
thus corresponds to the accuracy of the diagnosis and is
equal to 0 if the diagnosis effort is equal to the complete
execution thread, while it is equal to 1 when the diagnosis
effort is restricted to 1 statement.
Global diagnosability of a system ðÞ. The global diagno-
sability of a system S is the probable degree of diagnosis
accuracy obtained depending on the embedded contracts
density and efficiency. It is computed from the global diagnosis
effort  as follows:  ¼ 1 =#stats.
With the assumptions already given, the diagnosis effort
curve (for an execution thread and a given average contract
efficiency, function of the contract density—number of
contracts per statement) is proportional to the size of the
execution thread.
Fig. 12 presents the same results with both scales in
terms of “absolute” diagnosis effort and in terms of global
diagnosability. Diagnosis effort curves are given for various
contracts’ efficiency with a 1,000-statement thread—the
absorption coefficient is equal here to 0.8 (it corresponds to
the factor K used to compute vigilance in Sections 3 and 4).
The global diagnosability is thus directly obtained by
any execution thread and, for example, by those given in
Fig. 12. The gap between local diagnosis effort values and
global diagnosability is thus bridged thanks to a useful
property of the model: The global diagnosability of a
system only depends on its contracts’ efficiency and density
as shown in Fig. 12.
5.3 Discussion on Diagnosability
Let us interpret the results of Fig. 12. First, we remark that
the introduction of contracts quickly enhances the global
diagnosability of the system. Second, the addition of many
contracts (high contract density) does not significantly
improve a system global diagnosability (which is upper
bounded around 0.6 with 0.2 efficient contracts or around
0.9 with 0.4 efficient contracts). Third, the efficiency of the
contracts (isolated vigilance) is more important than their
number since it is the only way to make the upper bound to
diagnosability increase.
The conclusions we can deduce from this measure are
the following:
. A 0.2 contract density is enough to reach the upper
bound of diagnosability for a given contract average
efficiency. This density corresponds to the execution
of one contract every five statements (on average).
This is realistic in an OO system where methods are
often small and where delegation is intensively used.
Indeed, each delegation implies a method call and,
thus, the execution of its contracts. In most cases, the
use of assertions in the body of methods is thus
useless. This result could not be easily predicted
without a mathematical model.
. Quality is better than quantity. For the same density,
the efficiency of contracts highly changes the
diagnosability. It is important to put the effort into
the design of well-defined interfaces and efficient
contracts.
Design by contract is an efficient way of improving the
diagnosability of a system and its general quality.
6 RELATED WORK
To our knowledge, a few works have tackled the issue of
estimating the qualitative impact of design by contract for
software construction. Briand et al. have studied the impact
of contracts for testability of object-oriented systems in [25].
Nordby et al. [5] have proposed a development methodol-
ogy based on contracts and showed that it speeds up the
testing and integration phases. Other works have focused
on contracts as a means for testing [37], [38] or proving [39].
In [25] and [27], Briand et al. investigate the instrumenta-
tion of analysis contracts in object-oriented systems for
helping the detection and isolation of faults. First, they
provide the guidelines they have followed to add contracts
to the system they want to study and give details about the
translation of contracts written in OCL to executable
contracts written with a commercial tool for Java. The rest
of the paper consists of studying the impact of the analysis
contracts as a substitute for test oracles and as a factor for
helping diagnosability. The case study consists of an ATM
system written in Java. The study of contracts as test oracles
consists of seeding faults in the system, running test cases
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Fig. 11. Tuning for 10 contracts.
Fig. 12.  and  results—Main results.
on the faulty versions, and measuring the effectiveness of
failure detection by contract violation. They seed 14 different
types of faults, but the fault seeding is done by hand and
the study is run with only 69 faulty versions of the system.
For the diagnosability analysis, they run the test cases on
the faulty versions of the system with contracts as oracles
and, without contracts, using a manual oracle. Then, in the
case where a fault has been detected by a contract and the
explicit oracle, they look at the execution thread to
determine whether contracts can actually help the diag-
nosis. The whole is very detailed in the paper, but the lack
of systematic approach for the mutation analysis and of an
abstract model for both factors makes the conclusions
difficult to generalize.
In [5], Nordby et al. propose a methodology to use
contracts in the different phases of the development process.
They distinguish two types of contracts: weak and strong.
Strong contracts require that the client satisfies a specific
condition, the postcondition then states the outcome only in
the legal situations. For weak contracts, the client has no
obligation (precondition is true), the postcondition then has
to take into account the outcome even in the case of a
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Fig. 13. Distribution of method calls along an execution thread in five systems.
meaningless call. Both types of contracts are used at different
moments during the development of the software: Strong
contracts help in writing unit components and finding
internal errors, while weak contracts are used when the
component is released for integration. In [5], the authors
propose a systematic method to weaken strong contracts.
Then, results are given for an industrial case study. Strong
contracts enable rapidly detecting faults when writing two
components. Contracts have then been weakened and no
error was introduced during this operation.
Other works on contracts focus on the methodology to
improve software quality through testing or proof. In [39],
Meyer proposes a general framework to prove object-
oriented classes designed by contract. The idea is that
contracts defined for classes correspond to minimal
specification of the behavior. It should then be proven that
the implementation actually conforms to the specification.
In the paper, he takes an Eiffel library as an example and
suggests a solution to prove effective implementations of
abstract classes. Then, he lists the different issues that arise
to actually prove the classes. The first one is to be able to
derive abstract mathematical properties from the model
contracts. The second one is the scalability of the approach:
It should be applicable on a larger scale than a class, for
example, for a component.
Several works study contracts for testing, in particular to
automatically derive an oracle function. In [37], the authors
derive contracts from a formal specification for CORBA
components. Several rules are defined to prove the
consistency between the contracts obtained after derivation
and the formal specification. The contracts are then
complete and can be used as efficient embedded oracle
functions for testing. In [38], the authors use contracts
written with JML to derive oracles for test cases in the JUnit
format. They make no assumption about the completeness
of contracts and the technique they propose is more to
facilitate the design and the refactoring of JUnit test cases.
A secondary contribution of this work is the adaptation
of mutation analysis to evaluate the efficiency of contracts
(how complete they are). In other words, we have proposed
a way to estimate the completeness of the specification of
the program under test. Some works related to this issue
have used mutation analysis on models to evaluate the
coverage (a sort of completeness) provided by a specifica-
tion in the context of model-checking. In [40], Hoskote et al.
first proposed a measure for estimating the coverage for
model-checking using mutation operators defined on finite
State Machines. The idea of this work was to evaluate the
validity of formulas that are expressed on a State Machine.
Chockler and Kupferman extended this work in [41] for
coverage of Kripke structures.
7 CONCLUSION
Although there are several works that advocate the use of
assertions to improve software quality or the application of
Design by Contract to improve the design of a system, few
studies actually focus on measuring the impact of such
approaches. The work presented in this paper focuses on
measuring the impact of Design by Contract on two quality
factors: vigilance and diagnosability.
This study first consisted of precisely defining the
measures of vigilance and diagnosability, expressing the
expected properties for these measures, and in identifying
the measurable parameters that had to be taken into
account. An important parameter was the efficiency of
contracts. We thus propose a definition of contract
efficiency related to contract completeness and an adapta-
tion of mutation analysis to measure this efficiency.
Experimental work allowed us to tune the models for the
measures with values coming from an Eiffel case study. We
then computed the evolution of vigilance and diagnosa-
bility of several OO systems as a function of the efficiency of
their contracts. It appeared that efficient contracts signifi-
cantly contributed to improving the quality of the systems,
but also that their efficiency is more important than their
quantity. Furthermore, identifying clear interfaces to which
precise and efficient contracts can be attached seems a good
trade-off to improve the quality of software. Further studies
should focus on expressing rules and define guidelines to
efficiently write contracts when designing an OO system.
APPENDIX A
The curves presented in Fig. 13 represent the distribution of
method calls along an execution thread in five systems: Unit
Testing, Virtual Meeting, Junit Auto-Test, Loading JDK,
Jtree. In each case, the black curve is the actual distribution
and the dotted one the linear regression.
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